INTRODUCTION
In a recent review, Beals, Krantz, and Tversky (1968) presented and discussed axiomatizations of a number of the fundamental geometric models of multidimensional scaling, including metrics with additive segments, additive difference metrics, and a special case of both, the (Minkowski) power metrics. The exposition relied on a paper by Beals and Krantz (1967) and on several unpublished results. The main purpose of this paper is to publish proofs of the theorems previously discussed. In particular, Theorems 2 and 3 of Beals et al (1968) are included in Theorems 1 and 2 of the present paper. The statements about the power metric in the previous paper are consequences of a much-improved characterization presented here. We show that the i This research was supported by NSF Grants GB 4947 and GB 6782 to the University of Michigan.
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only additive difference metrics with additive segments are the power metrics (eliminating a major axiom, A7, used previously to characterize the power metric)
. In addition, we analyze a more general model than any previously considered in multidimensional scaling, called decomposability (Eq. 2 below). This model is of interest in its own right and serves also to unify our treatment of the different facets of the additive difference model, interdimensional additivity and intradimensional subtractivity.
We also take this opportunity to discuss the concept of "psychological dimension"
implicit in the present approach. The models to be discussed are all generalizations of the power metric (Minkowski r-metric, Lp metric), according to which the distance between the points s = (Xl ). . . , x,) andy = (yl ,..., yll) is given by d(.r,y) = [gl I xi -yyi lr]l", r 3 1.
The well-known Euclidean and city-block metrics are special cases of the power metric, where r equals 2 or 1, respectively. Equation 1 incorporates three fundamental assumptions.
(a) DECOMPOSABILITY.
The distance between points is a function of componentwise contributions. The distance is a function of the sum of component-wise contributions.
In psychological applications, stimuli x = (x1 ,..., x,) and y = (yl ,..., yn) may be characterized by their components, yet the numerical values of the corresponding coordinates in the psychological space are not known in advance. Furthermore, the actual distances between such points are also unknown; instead, one has some measure of dissimilarity, or "psychological distance," that is monotonically related to metric distance. Regarding the power metric as a model of "psychological distance," it can be generalized in three steps, with two branches. The most general equation embodies only decomposability (a):
4x, Y) = &4(x, > Y&., Mxn 3 YA (2) whereF is an increasing function 2 in each of its n arguments, and each & is a symmetric 2 Throughout the paper, we shall use the terms increasing and decreasing to mean strictly monotonically increasing and decreasing functions, respectively. All functions are real-valued. 
where we have replaced #+(xi , yJ by / Xi -Y, 1 and Xi = fi(xi) is the i-th coordinate of stimulus x in the psychological space. Note that Xi is a real number, though xi need not be.
If additivity (c) alone is assumed, the power metric is generalized to where F is now an increasing function in one argument. Note that subtractivity is an intradimensional property as it refers to differences along the same dimension while additivity is an interdimensional property as it refers to summation across different dimensions. Equations 3 and 4 are both special cases of Eq. 2, but represent separate branches in generalization.
If both additivity and subtractivity are assumed we obtain the additive difference model defined by d(x, Y> = F [tl $dI x'i -Yi I)] 7 where F and & , i = I,..., n, are all increasing functions of one variable. Equation 5 is a special case of both Eqs. 3 and 4 (for the di would be redundant in Eq. 3, since F is already a general function of n variables, increasing in each variable). The power metric is, clearly, a special case of the additive difference model, where all c$~ are the same convex power function and F is its inverse.
The purpose of the present paper is the analysis of the models represented by Eqs. l-5 from the viewpoint of measurement theory. As in multidimensional psychophysics, we assume that the stimuli can be labeled by a vector of (nominal scale) values on n dimensions, and that an ordinal measure of dissimilarity between the stimuli is given. The conditions (or axioms) which are necessary and/or sufficient to establish decomposability (2), subtractivity (3), additivity (4), or both (5) are presented in the next section. The conditions under which the additive difference model (5) satisfies the metric axioms, and an axiomatic ordinal characterization of the power metric (1) are discussed in Sec. II. The final section explores the implications of the results to the analysis of similarity.
I. ADDITIVE AND SUBTRACTIVE DIMENSIONS
The theory is formulated in terms of a product set A = 8, x *.. x A, and a real-valued function M defined on .4 x iJ. For example, A may be a set of color patches described in terms of their brightness, hue, and saturation, or a set of facial expressions described in terms of their intensity and pleasure, or a set of rectangles described by their height and width. The function M assigns to every pair of elements s, y in A, a scale value M(x, y), which is an ordinal measure of the dissimilarity, or the "psychological distance" between them. We use the letters U, U, w, x, y, z (with or without primes) to denote elements of A, with x = (sr ,..., XJ where xi denotes the i-th component of X.
Several comments about the primitives are in order. First, the factorial representation of a given set of stimuli need not be unique. Rectangles, for example, may be characterized in terms of height and width or in terms of area and shape. The present theory, therefore, depends on a particular factorial characterization of the stimuli. Second, the components of the stimuli may be nominal scale values and they need not be real numbers. Third, in referring to the number of factors of A, denoted n, we discard inessential factors that have only a single value. Fourth, the use of an ordinal scale M is not essential; it simplifies the axioms, but it can be replaced by an abstract order relation on A x A, provided that a separability axiom (Debreu, 1954) is introduced. In the case of color patches, we expect that the psychological dimensions, brightness, hue, and saturation, are more likely to satisfy the axioms than the more arbitrary coordinates, luminance, dominant wavelength, and purity. In the case of rectangles, the axioms may be better satisfied for height x width than for area x shape representations, or vice versa, depending on how the rectangles are perceived; this could vary between subjects or be influenced by context.
To further simplify the statement of the axioms, a notion of betweenness is defined. We say that y is between x' and Z, denoted x / y 1 Z, if the following two conditions hold (9 M(.x, 4 2 M(x, y), M(y, z) (ii) xi = yi = zi for any i where si = zi .
Thus, y is between x and z if it coincides with x and z on any dimensions on which they are equal, and if its dissimilarity from each of them does not exceed M(x, z).
The basic axioms may now be stated as follows.
(Al) If x f y, then M(x, x) = M(y, y) < M(y, x) = M(x, y).
(A2) If M(w, x) < 01 < M(w, x), then there exists y such that x / y [ z and M(w, y) = ct. TVERSKY AND KRANTZ (A3) For any i = I,..., n, ;f xi = Xi', yj = ya', zi = zi', wj = wj', and for all j f i, xj = Zj , xj' = z,', yj = wj , and yj' = wj', then M(x, y) < M(x',y') if and only if M(x, w) < M(z', w').
(A4) For any i = l,..., n, if xi = zi , xi' = xi', yi = wi , yi' = wi', and for all j # i, Xj = Xi', yi = yj', zj = .z,', and wj = w,', then M(x, y) < M(x', y') if and ally if M(z, w) < M(z', w').
(A5) For any i = l,..., n, if for all j # i, xj = yj = zj = wj , and x / y 1 z, then (i) ify/z~wandy#z,thenxjy/wandx~z~w (ii) ifxIzIw,thenxIyIwandy[zIw.
(A6) For any i = I,..., n, if for all j f i, xj = yj = Zi = Xj' = yj' = ZJ', x [ y / z, x' 1 y' / z', and M(y, z) = M(y', z'), then M(x, y) ,( M (x', y') if and only 4 M(x, z) < M(x', 2').
The axioms are practically identical to those discussed in Beals et al. (1968) and we shall not repeat the discussion here, except to remind the reader of a few salient mathematical points. The first axiom asserts that M is minimal between a point and itself, and symmetric in its two arguments. The second axiom is a solvability condition analogous to ones used in other areas of measurement theory (e.g., Lute, 1966) . The third axiom is the important independence condition, which is the basic axiom of the general theory of additive conjoint measurement (see Debreu, 1960 For an empirical test of (A3) in a three-dimensional case, using schematic faces as stimuli, see Tversky and Krantz (1969) .
Finally, both (A5) and (A6) are unidimensional properties that apply to elements of A that coincide on all but one dimension. The statement of (A6) differs slightly from that of Beals et al. (1968) , but in the context of (Al), (A2), and (A5), the two are logically equivalent. The major results that are based on the above axioms are summarized in the following theorem. We now use (A4) to prove that F is well-defined and increasing in each variable; this establishes decomposability.
Suppose that Cz(xi, yJ = &(xi', yi'), i = I,..., n. To show that F is well-defined, we must show that &2(x, y) = &2(x', y'). For r = O,..., n, let x(r) be the element of A whose i-th component is xi for i > r and xi' for i < r; define y(') similarly. Then for i = l,..., n, we have, forj # i, 
We may thus apply (A4), with xfi-l), yti-l', ~(~1, yti' playing the roles of X, y, x', y', and with Ui(x,), U,(yJ, UJx,'), U,(y,') playing the roles of z, w, a', w', to obtain if and only if The proof that F is strictly increasing in each variable is exactly parallel to the above, except that one of the equalities &(x~ , yi) = (bi(xi', yi') is replaced by strict inequality, and we obtain correspondingly a strict inequality between M[x'~~~', ~'~-l'] and M[@, ~'~'1, hence, between M(x, y) and M(x', y'), as required.
To complete the proof of part (a), we must show that decomposability implies (A4) and that the Ci are ordinal scales. Suppose that there exist functions I,!Q on Ai x Ai andGon Range+, x **a x Range&, such that M(x,y) = G[h(x, ,yd,..., ~4h ,yJl.
By definition,
.., #AXi 9 Yi),..., #n(~n > ~11, so $Q is an increasing function of & . Conversely, any increasing functions of the & can be used in a representation of form of Eq. 2, so the I#Q are ordinal scales. To show (A4), it suffices to note that under the hypotheses of (A4), M(x, y) >, M(x', y') if and only if &(xi , yi) 3 &(x6', y,') (since the arguments of F are equal for j f i). Similarly, M(z, w) > M(z', w') if and only if #Q(.z~, wi) 3 &(zi', wi'). Since xi = zi, etc., the conclusion of (A4) follows. This completes part (a).
To prove part (b), we proceed as follows. For each i, we must construct fi on A,
where & is the function constructed above for decomposability, and hi is an increasing function. Intradimensional subtractivity holds if and only if this is possible. This is essentially a one-dimensional problem,
i.e., the functions & , j f i, have nothing whatever to do with the possibility of writing CJ$ in the needed form. Hence, we identify each x with Ui(xi), holding all coordinatesj f i fixed at Uj , and we drop the i subscript for the remainder of the proof. The antecedent conditions of (A5) and (A6), asserting xj = yj = zj = Wj , or .xj = yj = x, zzz *y,' = yj' = zj', for all j f i, will always be satisfied automatically, since all such coordinates are equal to uj . Thus, we apply the one-dimensional axioms (A5) and (A6) without reference to any subscripts.
How can the psychological scale, f, be constructed ? Suppose we set f = 0 for some one element (for concreteness, f(u) = 0), and choose some element v f u to have f(v) = 1. Suppose that u 1 v / w. Suppose also that we construct a sequence z("), $1' ) . . . ) ,&lJ' ) . . . , .a(*) such that Z(O) = U, Z(Y) = U, and .z(@ = w, such that the $1 are equally spaced and ordered-that is, .$j-1) 1 .S) j ,&j+l) holds for j = l,..., 4 -1 and
is constant, independent of j. Intuitively, the u, z, interval is composed ofp equal intervals; therefore each has psychological length (
and u, w is composed of q of the same intervals, thus it has psychological length q/p. Hence, we must define f(w) = q/p. Th is indicates the actual construction of the functionf. This construction is just like dividing a meter stick (e.g., U, v) into p = 1000 equal parts, and then seeing how many millimeters (e.g., 4) are required to span u, w;
The length of u, w in meters is then q/1000. Equality of millimetric divisions is replaced by equisimilarity,
.. ; ordering of the millimeters along a straight line corresponds to the requirement z(j-r) 1 z(j) 1 z(j+l), which is inferred from proximity data via the above definition of betweenness. It remains to be proved that this equisection process will really give consistent results (e.g., suppose the z(j) sequence is replaced by one with smaller or larger steps) and that the function f, so constructed, will predict the order of all proximity comparisons.
The roles of (A5) and (A6) in such a proof are quite clear. Axiom (A5), if satisfied, guarantees that the "betweenness" inferred from proximity ordering is well-behaved; for example, if ,&-l) 1 .N / .S+l), and .G / a(j+r) j a(j+s), we know also that
1 z(j+2). Axiom (A6) guarantees that two equal steps y, .Z and y', UC', in different parts of the scale, add on in the same way. For example, we can deduce, for the above sequence z(j), that M[G, JZ(~+~)] is also constant, independent of j, using (-46).
We have taken pains to make clear the intuitive method of scale construction, and the reasons why properties (AS) and (A6) are needed to guarantee that it will work, because the formal proof does not proceed by showing in detail the consequences of the construction off just sketched. We could so proceed, but it would be very redundant to do so. The similarity of the above constructive scheme to measurement of physical length is more than a superficial analogy-the measurement-theoretic analysis of extensive measurement is directly applicable. What we do is reduce this case directly to one of the standard theorems on extensive measurement (Krantz, 1968) , and use the real-valued function which that theorem tells us exists to construct f. The counting-of-equal-units process is contained in the proof of the extensive measurement theorem and so does not appear explicitly here.3
Let T denote the interior of the range of # ( remember, subscripts are dropped). By (Al) and (A2), T is an open interval of real numbers, with lower bound 4(x, x); it may or may not be bounded above. We define a binary operation, (s, t) ---f s * t, on a subset of T x T, as follows:
If s = 4(x, y), t = $(Y, 4, and '4Y I"", then s * t = +(x, z).
That * is well-defined follows readily from (A6). Denote by B the subset of T x T for which * is defined.
LEMMA.
The quadruple (T, B, *, 2) (where > is the natural ordering of real numbers) is an Archimedean positive ordered local semigroup in the sense of Krantx (1968) ; that is:
1. 3 is a total order;
if (s, t) E B, s 2 s', t > t', then (t', s') E B; 3. ;f (Y, s), (Y * s, t) E B, then (s, t), (r, s * t) E B and (Y * s) * t = Y * (s in t);
4. if r > s and (r, t) E B, then Y ;I; t 3 s * t and t * r 3 t * s; 5. if(s,t)EB,thens*t >s; 6. ;f t > r, then there exists s E T with (Y, s) E B and t > Y c s;
7. for any s, t in T, the set of integers m such that ms is dejined and t 3 ms isjnite [where 1s is defined as s, and if (m -1)s is defined, and ((m -l)s, s) E B, then ms is defined as (m -1)s es].
Proof.
1. The first property is trivial. 2. Assume s = 4(x, y), t = +(y, z), x 1 y / z. Since s' < s, by (A2) there exists y' with x / y' 1 y and 4(x, y') = s'. By (AS), y' I Y I 2, so $(Y', 4 3 t 3 t'. By W), there exists z' with y' j z' / x and +(y', z') = t'. Since (A5) implies z' 1 y' I X, and c#(z', y') = t', +(y', x) = s', we have (t', s') E B.
3. Using (A2) and (A6) we can find x, y, x, and w such that r = 4(x, y), s=+(y,x), t =$(z,w), withxlylzand xIz(w. By (A5),ylzlw,so(s,t)EB, and s * t = +(y, w). By (A5), x / y 1 w, so (Y, s * t) E B and Y c (s * t) = +(x, w) = (Y * s) * t.
4. Follows immediately from (A6).
a It can also be shown that the present assumptions allow us to construct a system satisfying the axioms of Suppes and Winet (19.53, who gave the first axiomatization of intradimensional subtractivity.
The major advance in our treatment, besides simplicity of assumptions, is the elimination of their primitive (undefined) ordering along the dimension.
Let s = $(x, y), t = #(y, )
z w h ere x 1 y 1 Z. Since T is the interior of the range of $, t > $(y, y) = glb T; thus, y f Z. We can apply (A6) to the triples x, y, x and x, y, y to deduce that 4(x, Z) > 4(x, y), or s * t > s.
6. Follows immediately from (A2).
7. Assume the contrary, i.e., that there exist s, t such that ms is defined for every positive integer m and t > ms for all m. Let t = 4(x, Z) and s = 4(x, x(i)), where .r / x(i) 1 Z. Since s c s is defined and <t, we know from (A6) that #(x(l), .a) > s; thus, we can find xt2) with .x(l) 1 xt2) / z and +(x(l) , xt2)) = s. This process can be continued indefinitely, obtaining
.., such that xX'(i) / ~c(~+i) / x(~+~) and x(i) / ,diA1) 1 z for i = 0, 1, 2 ,... . We have ms = 4(x, x("')) < t for all m. The sequence $(x, X(m)) is increasing and bounded above, so it has a limit, Y, in T. Thus, for some y,
x Iy 1 aand&x,y) = Y.
Now choose y' with x / y' j y and with +(y', y) = s. By property 5, 4(x, y) = +(x, y') * +(y', y) > 4(x, y'). Therefore there exists some m such that 4(x, y) > 4% x cm)) > 4(x, y'). Since 4(.x, x(")) > 4(x, y') and +(x(~), x("l+l)) = s = +(y', y), it follows from (A6) that 4(x, x(~+I)) > 4(x, y), a contradiction. (If there is an upper bound of form $(u', v') for T, then choosing u distinct from u',v' is sufficient to guarantee that 4(u, x) E T for all x f u.) It remains to be shown that +(x, y) is an increasing function of if(x) -f(y)l. Now x can be in one of three regions, defined by x / u / v, u / x 1 v, and u 1 v I x, and so can y; this yields nine cases. The proof in each case is very simple; we carry through two cases for illustration. This is a standard problem in additive conjoint measurement (see Lute, 1966 ). We will not review here the construction of the appropriate transformed &'s; it is similar to the constructions of extensive measurement (see Krantz, 1968, and Lute and Tukey, 1964 , for details). The simplest proof is obtained by reducing the theorem to that of Debreu (1960) .
Debreu's theorem gives sufficient conditions for a function F on a product set T = Tl x --. x T,, to be written as F(t) = G(xy=, Ai(t The conditions (for n 3 3) are:
1. Each Ti is a connected and separable topological space.
2. If rj = tj , j f i, and F(Y) < 01 <F(t), then there exists s, with s, = r, = tj for j f i, and F(s) = 0~.
3. If sj = sj' and tj = tj' for all j # i, and si = ti , si' = ti', then F(s) < F(t) if and only if F(s') ,< F(t').
4. For any s, the sets {t 1 F(s) 2 F(t)} and {t 1 F(t) 2 F(s)} are closed in the product topology on T.
To apply this theorem, let Ti be the range of & (for part (b), we had let Ti be the interior of the range). Each Ti is an interval of real numbers so Condition 1 is satisfied (indeed, Debreu uses Condition 1 only to replace his topological spaces by isomorphic real intervals). Condition 2 follows readily from (Al) and (A2), while Condition 3 is essentially the same as (A3). Only Condition 4 offers a bit of difficulty; it is established as follows.
To show that (t / F(t) 3 F(s)) is closed, let t be an arbitrary element not in this set, i.e., F(t) < F(s). We must show that there is a neighborhood N of t, in T, such that F(P) < F(s) for all t' E N. We define elements ti* E Tj inductively as follows. Suppose that ti* has been defined for i < k, where 1 < K < 71, and thatF(t,* ,..., t;-i, t, ,..., t,) (which we denote akc-i for short) satisfies the inequalityF(t) ,( 01~~~ < F(s). Define tk* as follows. If t, = lub Tk , let f,* = t, . (Note that in this case, 01~ = (~,+i and we are done with this step.) Otherwise, choose rli E Tk , with rk > t, . SinceF(t,*,..., tzpl , rk , tt+1 >.'., t,J > 01~~~ > F(t), we can choose a number (Ye satisfying F(t) ,( akP1 < 01~ < min{F(s), F(t,* ,..., tc-;*-l , rL , tk+l ,..., t,J} and can then choose t,* with t, < t,* < rk such that F(tl*,..., tk*, t,,, ,..., t,) = aii as required. Denoting (tl*,..., tn*) by t*, we have, by construction, F(t) < F(t*) <F(s), and for each i, either ti* = lub Ti or ti < ti *. If ti* = lub T, , let Ni = Ti ; otherwise, let Ni = {ti' j ti' < t,*). In either case, Ni is open in Ti , so N = Nl x ... i< N, is open in T. Clearly, F(t') < F(t*) f or all t' E N, so N is the required neighborhood.
The other half of Condition 4 is proved in the same way, with inequalities reversed. Applying Debreu's theorem now shows that (A3) implies interdimensional additivity. The converse is straightforward.
The uniqueness follows from standard uniqueness results for n-dimensional conjoint measurement (e.g., Debreu, 1960; Lute, 1966 
where & is an increasing function, i = I,..., 71. Substituting q$ for & yields the additive difference model (Eq. 5).
The functions & in Eq. 5 can be normalized so that 4,(O) = 0; this makes them ratio scales.
Finally, we note that Debreu's theorem applied only for n > 3; for 71 = 2, he proved the same result, assuming the Thomson condition from the theory of webs in place of Condition 3. But this latter condition follows from (A3') just as his Condition 3 follows from (A3). This establishes part (e) of the theorem. For n = 1, only part (b) (which was proved without any restriction on n) is of interest-decomposability and additivity are trivial.
II. ADDITIVE DIFFERENCE METRICS
The additive difference model (Eq. 5), established in Theorem 1, provides a measurement of dissimilarity that generalizes the power metric (Eq. I). Nevertheless, it need not be a metric distance function. A metric distance function or a metric, for short, is a function from A x A into the reals, which assigns to every pair of points X, y a number d(x, y), called their distance, such that the following conditions are satisfied. 
Hence, in particular, (M4) implies that for all y in Y, d(x, y) + d(y, z) = d(x, z). An ordinal axiomatization
of a metric with additive segments (i.e., a scale satisfying (Ml), (MZ), (M3), and (M4)) has been developed by Beals and Krantz(l967) .Note that the above axioms are applicable to any arbitrary set of points. If our object set, however, has a product structure (like the object sets discussed in the previous section) it may be of interest to investigate a weaker version of (M4) where segmental additivity is postulated for points that differ only on one dimension.
Stated formally, we obtain (M4') SEGMENTAL ADDITIVITY.
(M4) h Id f o s or any points x, x that d@er on one dimension only.
We refer to a metric scale as a metric with additive segments or as a proper metric depending on whether it satisfies (M4) or (M4'), respectively. An additive difference model (Eq. 5) is said to be compatible with a metric, if there exists a metric, d, satisfying
Mb-4 4 d M(y, 4 if and only if d(w 4 < d(y, 4,
for all w, X, y, z in A. This section is devoted to the investigation of the constraints imposed on the additive difference model by the assumption that it is compatible with a metric satisfying (M4) or (M4').
From the assumption that an additive difference model is compatible with a proper metric, it follows that there exists some increasing function F such that for all X, y in ,4 (6) If X, z differ on the i-th dimension only, then any y on the additive segment Y joining them must also differ from them on the i-th dimension only (otherwise, it is easy to show that the triangle inequality would be violated). For an additive d#erence model to be compatible with a proper metric, it is necessary that the functions & , i = I ,..., n, satisfy (9 h(a) = #dtia) (ii> C(a + PI 2 544 + 4(P).
It is su&ient that $ is of the form lj(cx) = p(e*a -1)', for p>O, q>O, ral.
Thus, according to Theorem 2, any proper metric that is compatible with an additive difference model must be of the form 4% Y> = 4-l i 4@i I xi -yi I) 1 for some superadditive C#J.
It is readily seen that the power metric provides one example of a proper metric where +(a) = c?, for some Y >, 1. Another example of a proper metric, called the exponential metric, is obtained by letting $(a) = eqa -1, for some q > 0. An extension of both the power metric and the exponential metric is given in (7). The exponential metric is clearly a special case of (7) where p = Y = 1. The power metric is obtained from (7) by letting p + co and q -0, keeping constant the quantity k = pqT. Here, $(a) converges uniformly to ka'.
To prove the second part of Theorem 2, we have to show that the form defined by Eqs. 8 and 7, is a proper metric. It is immediately verifiable that (Ml), (M2), and (M4') are satisfied, hence we have only to show that (M3) is also satisfied. Letting Thus, we have seen that (7) and (8) d o indeed define proper metrics, but we do not know whether these metrics exhaust the class of additive difference models that are compatible with a proper metric. That is, we do not know whether there exist some other solutions, 4, to Inequality 9.
A close inspection of the last part of the proof of Theorem 2 reveals that the triangle inequality is satisfied with equality only if +(ai) r&Ij) = 0 for any i # j. But since 4 is increasing and 4(O) = 0, the above product vanishes only if j Xi -Yj 1 . 1 Yj -Zj 1 = 0 for all i f j. Hence, unless X, y, and z differ only on one dimension, y must coincide with x and/or x. We have, thus, demonstrated the following:
The metric defined by (7) and (8) Although the power metric can be viewed as a limiting case of the metric defined by (7)and (8), it differs from nonlimiting cases of this family in that it satisfies segmental additivity. In other words, the above corollary does not hold in the limit: for every x and Z, the triangle equality holds for every y on the affine straight line joining x and Z. To see this, note that y is on the affine segment joining x and z if there exists t, 0 < t < 1, such that Yi = (1 -t) Xi + tZi , i = 1 ,..., n. We have
Moreover, the power metric is characterized by this fact: it is the only additive difference metric which is also a metric with additive segments. This is a new result, not announced in Beals et al. (1968) .In that paper, an additional axiom(A7) was introduced, to the effect that the affine midpoint of any two points lies on the additive segment between them, and the above result was stated, assuming that (A7) held. However, it turns out to be unnecessary to assume (A7). The precise theorem is as follows: We remark that, as a corollary, for S equal to all of Euclidean n-space, the only metrics with additive segments satisfying intradimensional subtractivity are the general Minkowski metrics (see Busemann, 1955, pp. 94-104) . The homogeneity of the metric in Theorem 3 follows from the above lemma, without use of interdimensional additivity.
Using homogeneity and interdimensional additivity,
we then obtain the power metric from a theorem of Hardy, Littlewood, and Polya (1952) on homogeneous means. Note that in the above lemma, and in the following proof, the terms "open," "closed,"
and "continuous" refer exclusively to the natural topology of Euclidean n-space, not to the relative topology induced by S nor to the metric topology induced by d. within a given distance of X, then any convex combination of them is within that same distance of x. Note that once this convexity result is established, so that d[x + (z -x)/m] = d(x, x)/m for sufficiently large integers m, the lemma follows. For by segmental additivity, the same equation holds for t = k/m, wherever 0 < k < m and m is sufficiently large; and by monotonicity, it follows for 0 < t < 1. So we turn to the matter of convexity of spheres. To establish this, we use the Krein-Milman theorem (1940), which asserts that a closed convex set in Euclidean n-space is the closed convex hull of the set of its extreme points. (Extreme points are not proper convex combinations of any other points.) Let x be fixed and let B(ol) denote the sphere with center x and radius 01, i.e., {y j d(x, y) < a}. Let C(a) be the convex hull of B(a), i.e., the smallest convex set containing B(a), which is the set of all convex combinations of elements of B(a). By continuity of d, for 01 sufficiently small, B( 01 is a closed set entirely contained in S. ) The convex hull of a closed set is closed, so C(a) is a closed convex set. By the Krein-Milman theorem, the set of extreme points of C(a), denoted E(a), is the minimal set whose convex hull is dense in C(ar). In particular, B(U) contains E(a). Thus, to prove that B(a) is convex (equal to C(a)), it suffices to show that any convex combination of elements of E( cy. is in B(or). It even suffices to show this for convex combi-) nations of form & yti)/r, where yfi) . is in E(a), since such combinations are dense in C(a) (any convex combination with rational coefficients can be written in such a form, by letting Y be a common denominator).
We showed above, using segmental additivity and intradimensional subtractivity, that y in B(or) implies that y/r is in C(ol/r) (th ere, we used a vector of formy = z -x, but this is irrelevant). But if y is in E(a), then y/r must be in E(ol/r). For suppose the contrary, i.e., y/m = cEl hiwti), where Xi > 0, XI=, hi = 1, and wci) is in C(OI/Y). Since C(OI/Y) is the set of convex combinations of B(c+), we can suppose without loss of generality that w fi) is in B(~/Y).
By the triangle inequality, rwti' is in B(a); hence y = x:-r &YW(~) is not in E(a), a contradiction. Hence, a convex combination Cl=, y(i)/~, with yci) in E(a), has each yu)/v in B(a/r). By translation invariance and the triangle inequality, CL, yu)/r is in B(a) as required. Thus we have shown that B(a) is convex (for 01 small enough so that B( 01 is a closed set in S). Since we apply the result ) only for OL = d(x, z)/m, for sufficiently large m, we can assume that m is large enough to obtain B(a) convex. This establishes the lemma completely. We shall show that the only solutions to the functional Eq. 10 are of form $(a) = RCZ. To do this, two steps are required. First, we make some remarks about the domains of 01~ , t for which Eq. 10 has been shown to hold, and show that 4 can be extended to map [0, co) onto itself, with (10) valid for 0 < 01~ ,..., 01,) t < co. Second, we show that Eq. 10 implies that 4 satisfies another functional Eq. 12, for which the only solutions are d Thus 4 satisfies cb-l(u) = (Q/w) $w4=), 0 < a < n&J).
(1 lb)
We can use (1 la) to define 4 for CL such that the right side of (1 la) is defined, i.e., for 0 < 01 < Q2/w. Note that Q2/w > .R, so this really does extend 4 beyond the interval 4w7/3-I4 TVERSKY AND KRANTZ [0, Q] . Correspondingly, 4-r satisfies (11 b) for the extended interval 0 < a < n+(Q) = a"+(w). Moreover (10) is now valid for 0 < oli < Q and 0 < t < 1:
(by 114
(by lib)
(by 10, applied for pi = c+J/!J < w)
(by lib) (by lla).
Repeatedly applying the arguments extends the intervals in which #J is defined and in which (10) is valid by a factor Q/W each time. Thus, we can extend 4 to [0, co), and have (10) valid for 0 < ai < co, 0 < t < 1. Under these circumstances, it follows immediately that (10) is valid for 0 < t < co. The function $, so extended, coincides with the original $ at least on [0, Q] . Now by (lib), we have, for 0 < 01~ < 00, It follows immediately that the homogeneity equation, (IO), applies to the mean-value function, +-'[( 1 /n) ,%#~(a~)] :
By a result in AczCl(l966, p. 153) an increasing function v, with ~(0) = 0, satisfying (12) for 0 < 01~ < co, 0 < t < GO, must be of form Roar.
Going back to the original function 4, we see that ~$(a) = Izc/, at least for 0 < 01 << 8. But now, for any j &Yi -ki I, i = I ,..., 71, we can find t > 0 so small that tti 1 xi -k'l / -< w, i = 1, . . . , n. Thus, using (10) (since we can assume t < I), we The restriction 1 < r < cc is occasioned, not by Eqs. 10 or 12, but by the need to satisfy the triangle inequality;
we refer the reader to standard discussions of the Minkowski inequality (e.g., Hardy et al., 1952, or any book on functional analysis).
III. PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS AND R/IETRICS
It has been shown in the previous sections that (Al)-(A6) yield additive difference measurement of dissimilarity between multidimensional objects. According to this model, dissimilarity judgments are described in terms of two sets of scales that apply to each one of the dimensions. The first set of scales, fr ,...,f,* , applies directly to the physical input and describes its psychological counterpart along each one of the dimensions.
We shall call them psychophysical functions. The second set of scales, d i ,..., & , applies to the perceived component-wise differences along the dimensions, and describes their contributions to the overall dissimilarity between the stimuli. We shall call them similarity functions. In the additive difference model, dissimilarity judgments are decomposed into two independent processes: a "perceptual" process satisfying intradimensional subtractivity, and an "evaluative" process satisfying interdimensional additivity. Another version of the additive difference model, that is based on preferences rather than similarity judgments, was presented in Tversky (1969) . Although the general concept of a similarity function has not been formally introduced, related notions have been proposed in the analysis of similarity judgments. In discussing the results of a two-dimensional similarity experiment, Attneave (1950) In the additive difference model, the stimuli are represented in a dimensionallyorganized space, but the dissimilarity ordering need not coincide with any metric. The assumption that an additive difference model is compatible with a proper metric imposes severe restrictions on the shape and the interrelations among the similarity functions, restrictions that may but need not be acceptable on empirical grounds. More specifically, if an additive difference model is compatible with a proper metric, all similarity functions must be essentially identical; moreover, they should all be superadditive.
In multidimensional scaling it is assumed that stimuli can be characterized by some (subjective) dimensions, and that the dissimilarity between them is compatible with a metric. It should be emphasized, however, that the dimensional and the metric assumptions are independent of each other, as each one of them can be satisfied without the other. The failure to distinguish between the metric and the dimensional assumptions hinders the explication of their empirical meaning and the clarification of their psychological justification.
What, then, is the psychological meaning of metrics and dimensions ?
The concept of a metric with additive segments has been analyzed in detail by Beals and Krantz (1967) (see also Beals et al., 1968) , so we limit our discussion to the concept of a psychological dimension-a concept that has been used in the literature in several different senses.
One meaning of the term dimension is a variable that can be manipulated experimentally, such as the intensity of a tone, or the shape of a geometric figure. This use of the term dimension is neutral from a psychological standpoint since it refers to the way in which stimuli are specified or generated physically and not to the way in which they are perceived. Several physical dimensions (in the above sense) may combine into a single psychological dimension and vice versa. A second meaning of the term dimension is a trait, or a variable, that cannot be observed or measured directly, but can be expressed in terms of other measurable traits or variables. The factor analytic definitions of pure neuroticism or of abstract reasoning ability are examples of dimensions that are defined as (linear) combinations of some measurable variables, such as various test scores. Hence, such definitions can be viewed as derived measurement.
The scaling of these dimensions (though not their labeling) does not depend on any testable psychological assumptions, rather it attempts to express a large number of correlated variables in terms of a smaller number of uncorrelated ones. The third, and by far the most interesting, meaning of the term dimension refers to the factors along which stimuli are perceived and structured.
In speaking of hue, saturation, and brightness as dimensions of color space, or of potency as a dimension of semantic space, it is typically implied that these dimensions serve as organizing principles in the perception of colors or words. To accept such an interpretation, however, one has to demonstrate the role played by the alleged dimensions in the perception of objects. This can be done in two different ways.
One approach consists of collecting introspective data, of a direct or an indirect nature, about the manner in which objects are perceived. The second approach consists of constructing dimensional models and then testing whether any variable (specified physically or defined in terms of other variables) acts like a dimension as defined in the model. In this approach, therefore, a psychological dimension is defined in terms of its formal characteristics.
Consequently, one can test which of several variables, if any, can be regarded as a dimension by studying its formal properties.
One necessary condition for defining a psychological dimension is the possibility of defining equivalence classes with respect to this dimension in a way that is independent of the levels of the other dimensions. Thus, if area, for example, is one of the psychological dimensions of geometric figures, then one would expect judgments concerning area to be independent of the shape of the figures. This may not be true when area is defined physically, but still be true when area is defined by a psychological rather than a physical operation.
Indeed, this is the major difficulty in specifying psychological dimensions in physical units.
The possibility of defining equivalence classes in an independent fashion, however, does not exhaust the properties expected of a psychological dimension. Additional properties can be discovered by examining the models proposed for similarity data. The analysis of a large class of multidimensional similarity models shows,that the dimensions of the space satisfy two major assumptions: (intradimensional) subtractivity and (interdimensional) additivity. These properties may, thus, be taken as defining properties for psychological dimensions. The axiomatic analysis of these properties reveals what are the testable ordinal assumptions that are necessary and/or sufficient for subtractivity and additivity to be satisfied. Hence, it provides methods for testing whether a given factor is a psychological dimension in the sense of satisfying subtractivity, and satisfying additivity with respect to some other dimensions.
The present approach is characterized by treating multidimensional scaling models as quantitative psychological theories rather than as methods for data reduction. It rests on the supposition that the axiomatic analysis of these models combined with the experimental investigation of their consequences will result in a deeper understanding of the metric and dimensional structures that underly similarity data.
